

# **MEDICAL DEVICE CYBERSECURITY**

**SETH D CARMODY PHD**

**CYBER SECURITY SUMMIT 2017**

**OCTOBER 23, 2017**


# Executive Orders (EO), Presidential Policy Directives, and Framework to Strengthen Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity

- EO 13636 (Feb 2013) → NIST Voluntary Framework (Feb 2014) **v1.1 in Draft Jan. 10, 2017**
- PPD 21 (Feb 2013)
- EO 13691 (Feb 2015) – establishment of Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAO)
- EO 13800, "Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure" May 17, 2017

# Informational Tech/Operational Tech



## Operational Technology



## IoT – Internet of Things



## Information Technology



## Internet-Connected Operational Technology

# FDA's Regulatory Scope



Center for Food Safety & Applied Nutrition



Center for Drug Evaluation & Research



Center for Biologics Evaluation & Research



Center for Tobacco Products



**Center for Devices & Radiological Health (CDRH)**



Center for Veterinary Medicine



National Center for Toxicological Research

# The Active Adversary, A Fine Wine

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BRICKELODEON —

## Rash of in-the-wild attacks permanently destroys poorly secured IoT devices

Ongoing "BrickerBot" attacks might be trying to kill devices before they can join a botnet.

DAN GOODIN - 4/6/2017, 5:15 PM



Enlarge

182

Researchers have uncovered a rash of ongoing attacks designed to damage routers and other Internet-connected appliances so badly that they become effectively inoperable.

PDoS attack bots (short for "permanent denial-of-service") scan the Internet for Linux-based

### Move over, Mirai

The attacks are a variation on those mounted by Mirai, a botnet made up of network cameras, digital video recorders, and other so-called Internet-of-things devices. The point of Mirai is to build an army of devices that


[cripple prominent websites](#) with

[record-setting distributed DoS attacks](#). The motivation

for the PDoS attacks remains unclear, in part because BrickerBot.2 attacked a much wider variety of storage devices—including those used by servers—rather than storage used

# Intended Use + Misuse

<http://hackaday.com/2015/09/07/brick-laying-robot-does-it-better/>



<http://www.technologyvista.in/pin/here-comes-the-brick-laying-robot-to-make-buildings/>

# Negative Requirements are *Infinite!*



**Features:**  
What a Device  
**MUST Do...**

Get drug libraries  
from the Internet

Thou, shall not  
under or over  
deliver therapy!


**Safety:**  
What a Device  
**MUST NOT do**

# Postmarket Cybersecurity Risk Assessment




Severity of Patient Harm (if exploited)

Negligible    Minor    Serious    Critical    Catastrophic



# Device Lifecycle: Ecosystem Challenges



# Empathy and Collaboration


*From EO 13636*

*“We can achieve these goals through a*




HOW **CEO SATYA NADELLA** USED  
EMPATHY AND COLLABORATION TO ENGINEER  
A \$250 BILLION TURNAROUND

*improve cybersecurity  
information sharing  
and collaboratively  
develop and  
implement risk-based  
standards.”*



# FDA's Approach to Cybersecurity



Halpern.pdf - Shortcut.Ink

# Questions?

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